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VASCO G. SEAVY, JR.*
"There is no branch of the law of evidence in such inextricable
confusion as that relative to confessions." ' This famous quotation
by Chief Justice Sherwood of the Missouri Court was made over
four decades ago, but in a large degree still exists as a quasi-truth
in many of our jurisdictions.
The principal reason for the confusion in regard to the prob-
lem of involuntary confessions might be said to stem from our
appellate court's inability to weigh modern reason and logic on
the one hand, and adherence to ancient and technical rules on the
other. The history of the rule shows that the result has often been
an "exhibition of morbid sensibility toward criminals." 2
Professor Wigmore in his work on evidence 3 has separated
the problem into three distinct historical periods. The first ex-
isted up through the middle of the eighteenth century during which
time a confession, whether voluntary or involuntary, was regarded
as a "plea of guilt." 4 The second stage was evidenced during the
latter half of the eighteenth century when the problem was rec-
ognized, but only in so far as that it existed.5
In the early years of the nineteenth century, there was the
beginning of the so-called "modern rule." In this period all con-
fessions were viewed with distrust.6 This stage reached its high
point in this country in 1897 when the United States Supreme
Court decided the Bram case 7 which will be discussed at a later
point.
Baron Parke summarized the third period in a statement made
in the case of Reg. v. Moore (1852).8 " * * * that if the threat
or inducement was held out, actually or constructively by a person
in authority, it cannot be received, however slight the threat or
inducement." The United States Supreme Court quoted with favor
the rule when deciding the Bram case, supra, and it was generally
held to be the existing law in all jurisdictions.'
It becomes clear by an examination of the test stated by Parke
that there was no logic nor reasonable basis for decisions involving
confessions during the period. The fourth stage can, therefore,
be defined as that period in which the appellate courts are to put
reason over technicality, logic over procedure, and modern public
* Student, University of Denver, College of Law.
'State v. Patterson, 73 Mo. 695, 705 (1881).
'Queen v. Johnston, 15 I. C. L. 60.85.
'Wigmore on Evid., Vol. 3 (3rd Ed), sec. 817.
'Hale, Pleas of the Crown, Emlyn's Ed. 225 (1680).
'Rudd's Case, 1 Leach Cr. C. 135, per Lord Mansfield (1775).
°Wigmore, op cit stipra, sec. 820.
Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L. Ed. 204 (1897).
b2 Den. C. C., 522 (1852).
-Wigmore, sapra, sec. 825.
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policy over an adherence to ancient rules which have long ceased
to have any distinction other than age.
PURPOSE, SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
The purpose of this article will be an attempt to show that
Colorado has reached this stage of "modern reason" in connection
with the problem of confessions. The general rules for the exclu-
sion will be helpful to clarify the problem. So also will a short
discussion of the United States Supreme Court cases help to show
by contrast the period of enlightenment into which our Colorado
Court has entered.
It will be necessary to limit the scope of the problem to those
matters related to the admission of confessions, i.e., in determin-
ing whether they are voluntary or involuntary. The scope will
be further limited to those confessions which are "extra-judicial"
in nature, and which are induced in one form or another by law
enforcement officers acting in their capacity of crime detection.
"A confession is an acknowledgment by an accused in a crimi-
nal case of his guilt of the crime charged." 10 Therefore, any state-
ment which would be exculpatory or an exoneration would not be
classified as a confession.' 1
Chamberlayne 12 has given five requisites enabling an extra
judicial confession to be admitted into evidence: (1) a declaration
by one accused of the crime involved in the proceedings, (2) in-
criminatory, (3) certain, (4) complete, and (5) voluntary. It is
the last problem with which we are here confronted.
It is extremely difficult to define the word voluntary as used
in this sense. A definition was attempted in the Colorado case of
Tuttle v. The People wherein the court stated that the confession
must proceed "from the spontaneous suggestion of the party's own
mind." 13 But Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court,
in an able dissenting opinion in the Ashcroft case,1 4 said in effect
that every confession made in response to questions by law en-
forcement officers was induced in some degree. Thus, it is the
degree of the inducement, in connection with its effect,15 which is
the test of voluntariness, and not the inducement standing alone.
PRINCIPLES OF EXCLUSION
There is no doubt but that modern day police practices war-
rant a close inspection of every confession claimed to be made
under duress. Wharton 16 once stated that the inquisition practices
of the twentieth century were so related to those of the sixteenth
century, that the Colorado legislature made it a felony to induce
"22 C.J.S., p. '1420.
,Walker v. The People, 126 Colo. 135, 248 P. (2d) 287 (1952).
Mora v. The People, 19 Colo. 255, 35 P. 179 (1893).
' Chamberlayne, Modern Law of Evidence, Vol. 2, sec. 1473.
"33 Colo. 243, 79 P. 330 (1905).
"Ashcraft v. Tenn., 320 U.S. 728, 64 S.Ct. 94, 88 L. Ed. 1192 (1944).
"Osborn v. The People, 262 U. S. 892 (1927).
"Wharton, Criminal Evidence, Vol. 2 (10th Ed.), see. 622f.
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confessions either by mental or physical duress. 17 This law still
remains in Colorado."' An examination of the "Wickersham Re-
port" 19 made in 1931 discloses many incidents of actual police
brutality in this respect. So also in the last decade have many
cases 20 appeared before the United States Supreme Court where
devices used to obtain confessions have a striking similarity to
those used in the medieval periods.
The problem, therefore, certainly cannot be considered as
having no bearing on modern jurisprudence.
Criticisms of the modern view in regard to the exclusion of
confessions are prevalent and in the most part justified. There
are many different views concerning the value of confessions rang-
ing from a statement by a South Carolina Court that a confession
is "in most cases the highest evidence that can be given." 21 to
Blackstone's remark that it "is the weakest and most suspicious
of all testimony." 22 It becomes clear then, why there is so much
confusion in regard to the entire doctrine of confessions when
their value is regarded with such contrast. Where confusion is
present, justified criticisms are only one step behind.
The basic criticism is, of course, that the rule of exclusion,
when based on grounds of the law of evidence, is illogical. It is
difficult to find a logical ground upon which an involuntary con-
fession is to be excluded. One writer has commented "that a per-
son should falsely accuse himself of having been guilty of a serious
crime may seem grossly improbable." 23 Certainly the duress would
have to be very great before one of strong constitution and reason-
able intelligence would falsely confess to a crime which possibly
would result in his execution.
Nevertheless, it is agreed by most authorities that the under-
lying principle of exclusion is the untrustworthiness of the evi-
dence.2 4 But the difficulty with this theory is that few courts are
willing to examine all the surrounding conditions of the induced
confession to see if the inducement actually had the effect of com-
pelling the particular defendant to confess falsely. The Colorado
Court has held that "it is no answer to say we cannot explore the
human mind. '2 5 Perhaps if all courts would take this approach the
doctrine of untrustworthiness would be a reality and not a mere
legal fiction in answer to a difficult problem.
Actually the reason for excluding involuntary confessions is
found in the ancient principle, emanating from the common law
"Colo. Laws, c. 195, p. 468 (1909).
"8 Colo. Stat. Ann., c. 48, sec. 153 (1935).
"Nat'l Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement.
(1931) Report No. 11, Lawlessness in Law Enforcement.
See ante, Supreme Court Cases.
-Columbia v. Harrison, 2 Mills Const. (S.C.) 215 (1818).
2-4 Black Comm. 357.
Chamberlayne, supra. sec. 1591.
'420 American Jurisprudence, 422, sec. 483.
Chamberlayne, supra, sec. 1481.
Wharton, supra. sec. 622e.
"Osborn v. The People, supra.
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and fixed in most state constitutions, that no one can be forced
to incriminate himself.2 11, If the problem were always explained
on this basis no attempt would be necessary to justify the rule
under some principle of evidence.
Under the Constitution of the United States, the Federal
Courts -are bound under the self incrimination clause 7 in like
manner as are the states under their respective constitutions. So
also may a constitutional basis be found for the rule when a state
case goes to the United States Supreme Court via the Fourteenth
Amendment. It is, of course, more difficult for that court to find
reversible error in alleged involuntary confessions under the Four-
teenth Amendment than under the Fifth Amendment, when the
case comes from a lower Federal Court. But regardless of where
the constitutional safeguards are found, they are present and
should be used as the basis for exclusion.
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
Before going into the Colorado cases, it is interesting to note
the confusion which exists in the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. It appears that the Court is in each case seeking
to promulgate a definite standard or a technical rule under which
the problem may be simplified. The result, as an examination of
a few cases will show, has only led to inconsistency and, conse-
quently, confusion.
Bram v. United States 28 was decided by that Court in 1897.
The facts were, briefly, that an officer of a ship was accused of
murdering the captain, put ashore in irons at Halifax, accused of
the crime and asked to confess by a law enforcement officer, sub-
sequently confessed; and then returned to the United States where
he was convicted. In the interrogation by the police officer, there
were no threats, no abuses, no prolonged questions, but merely an
accusation and a request for a confession. This said the Court,
"must have created an impression of hope, or of fear in remaining
silent," and consequently the confession was held to be improperly
induced. Wigmore cites the case as the most unreasonable perpetu-
ation of inappropriate doctrines.
2 9
It is necessary to skip almost one half century to bring the
present day rules into focus. The Court was first confronted with
the problem arising in a State Court in the case of Brown v. Mis-
sissippi.30 This case may be categorized with three other cases:
Chambers v. Florida,3' White v. Texas,32 and Ward v. Texas.33 In
each of the four cases there were negroes involved; each case
arose in the Southern section, and each was reversed on the grounds
SColo. Const., Ar. IV, sec. 18.
- United States Const., Amend. V.
'168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L. Ed. 204 (1897).
'Wigmore, sapra, p. 355.
297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682 (1936).
"309 U.S. 227. 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L. Ed. 716 (1940).
.2 310 U.S. 530, 60 S.Ct. 1032, 84 L. Ed. 1342 (1940).
3 316 U.S. 547, 62 S.Ct. 1139, 86 L. Ed. 1663 (1942).
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of involuntary confessions failing to meet the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In these cases, there can be no doubt
but that any reasonable court would have acted as did the Supreme
Court in reversing. The brutality involved gives weight to Whar-
ton's statement as to the close relationship of the sixteenth and
twentieth century inquisition practices.
3 4
But in 1943 came the famous McNabb case,"5 coming to the
Supreme Court via the lower Federal Courts. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter therein laid down the "civilized standard" rule of exclu-
sion, which was based upon the failure to take the defendant be-
fore a committing magistrate. Can any more logical grounds be
found for labelling a confession involuntary when the accused was
not immediately taken before a magistrate than when he is accused
and asked to confess as in the Bram case?
Nor was the Supreme Court satisfied with this "civilized
standard," for in 1944 that Court decided the case of Ashcraft v.
Tennessee." Here the Court devised another standard, that of
"inherent coercion." This was based upon thirty-six hours of
questioning the accused. Justice Jackson in his able dissent asked
the pertinent question, that if time were to be used as the stand-
ard, where was the line to be drawn? It is interesting to note here
that only three years prior to the Ashcraft case the same Court
could find no "inherent coercion" in forty two hours of no sleep
and continued questioning, but preferred to rest on the basis of
a state's sovereignty necessitating a "plain abuse" of Federal
right.3
7
These few cases illustrate the difficulty of the courts when
confronted with the problem of confessions to advance from
out-moded and inadequate standards to a position of realistic
approach to an involved question.
The problem will be greatly simplified when the United States
Supreme Court clarifies its position, for the influence of that
event upon the state courts could not be over-estimated..
8
COLORADO CASES
There have been three outstanding Colorado cases reversed
due to an involuntary confession being admitted as evidence.3 9
In Beery v. United States, decided in 1873, the court followed
the rule of the period and found that a slight chance of hope in
promises made was sufficient to render the confession involuntary.
At that time there was a strong dissent labelling the opinion of
Supra, note 16.
* McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943).
'320 U.S. 728, 64 S.Ct. 94, 88 L. Ed. 1192 (1944).
"Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 68 S.Ct. 280, 86 L. Ed. 166 (1941).
"For an examination of the Supreme Court cases see Inbau, "Confession
Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court," 43 Ill. L. R. 442.
McCormick, "Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of
Confessions," 24 Tex. L. R. 239.
Bruner v. The People, 113 Colo. 194, 156 P. (2d) 111 (1945);
Beery v. United States, 2 Colo. 183 (1873);
Read v. The People, 122 Colo. 308, 221 P. (2d) 1070 (1950).
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the majority one of the "venerable errors abounding in the law
* * * respectable only for their antiquity." 40
The second of the three, Bruner v. The People, is a clear case
of abuse by police officers. The defendant was questioned for fif-
teen hours, threatened throughout, denied food and rest, and denied
the satisfaction of the calls of nature. The Court found that the
defendant was justified in believing that such treatment would
continue until he confessed.
In the last case, Read v. The People, the defendant was in
such a state of mental depravity when she was being questioned
that there was no doubt of her inability to have the mental capacity
to render a voluntary confession. The state of mind was not caused
by any duress stemming from police officers, but existed due to
extraneous circumstances.
These cases illustrate the point that the Court will, when
necessary, declare a confession to be involuntary, but that there
must be clear and convincing proof of the causal relationship be-
tween the inducement or mental incapacity and the confession.
So also do the three cases illustrate three separate problems under
the confession dilemma.
The Beery case comes under the heading of those induce-
ments tending to incite hope, fear, or some other state of mind
which would render the confession invalid when made thereto.
The Bruner case is illustrative of actual physical abuse, and the
Read case shows a state of mental incapacity rendering the con-
fession "involuntary."
THE OSBORN CASE
The entire confession doctrine is discussed in the case of
Osborn v. The People, supra. This case should be discussed before
going any further. Its importance in this respect cannot be over-
estimated. The case, standing alone, is sufficient evidence of Colo-
rado's enlightenment.
The defendants, Osborn and Noakes, were convicted of first
degree murder. One of the defendants was brought to Denver
and his treatment, while then incarcerated, was the basis for the
involuntary contention.
The defendant had been placed in jail on a Saturday where
he remained until Monday at which time he was brought before
the Chief of Police. The defendant was questioned for short in-
tervals throughout the day, and during the intermissions of the
questioning was placed into what was known as the "hole.' He
went without lunch during the day, and late in the afternoon
confessed.
The other defendant claimed that, because during the time
that he was being driven to Denver certain statements referring
to "neck cracking" were made to him by the Chief of Police, his




The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the trial court in
a decision written by Mr. Justice Butler. The entire history of
confessions was discussed, the Court recognizing the limitations
of the value of the rule and conceding the inadequacy of the courts
in handling the problem. The Court mentions in this respect the
case of Beery v. United States, supra, and while not specifically
overruling the case, it cites authorities who have agreed with the
dissenter, Mr. Justice Wells, and intimates that there would be
no reason to perpetuate the rule of that case.
41
The Court in deciding the case, settled certain points in con-
nection with the confession doctrine which have since become
established principles in this jurisdiction. The most important of
these should be enumerated and commented upon.
First, and most important, there must be a cause and effect
relationship between the inducement and the confession. 42 There-
fore, not every abuse rendered the defendant no matter how
slight will suffice to invalidate a subsequent confession. If the
abuse did in fact cause the defendant to confess, the confession
will be deemed involuntary. But, on the other hand, if the con-
fession-was made due to some reason other than the inducement,
the inducement has no effect on its voluntariness.
Second, the appellate court may "look into the mind" of the
defendant to see if the inducements actually caused the confession.
This, of course, is the method of arriving at the cause and effect
rule set out above. This point is evidence of the Court's refusal
to promulgate any technical rule under which to determine the
validity of a confession. It does signify, however, the principle
that each case shall be determined upon its own merits.
Third, the question of admissibility is one for the court. This
is very important, as the matter is one of law and as such should
not be left for the determination of the jury. Wigmore believes
that the practice in some jurisdictions of allowing the jury to
rule upon the question of admissibility is nothing short of heresy.
43
Fourth, the function of the jury is to determine the weight
to be given the confession. Of course, the jury may give the con-
fession no weight at all if it determines that it was made under
duress, but this is 'a proper function of the jury as there is no
difference in the type of evidence produced by an admitted confes-
sion from any other properly admitted evidence left for the de-
termination of the jury.
Fifth, the trial court's finding based upon conflicting evidence
cannot be disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.
Obviously, the trial court is in a better position to weigh the
conflicting evidence before it to determine this point than is the
appellate court which has before it only the printed record of the
proceedings. This rule has been rigidly adhered to in this jurisdic-
" Osborn v. The People, supra, p. 28.
12 Ibid, p. 37.
:,Wigniore, supr(, see, 961.
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fusion in regard to confessions in Colorado.
44
Here then is the law of confessions. Admittedly, if threats,
torture, hope, fear, or any other extraneous force did "in fact"
cause the accused to confess, the confession is involuntary. But
the inducements must cause the confession. Mere facts of state-
ments to the effect of "neck cracking," the placing in a "hole,"
the deprivation of lunch, the accusations, the advice to tell the
truth, the solitary confinement, and the intermittent questioning
while under arrest, are not sufficient, standing alone, to render a
subsequent confession involuntary.
There is, however, one criticism which may be made of the
Osborn case. On page 27, the Court quotes from Wigmore that
"the policy of the future * * * should be to receive all well
proved confessions in evidence, and leave them to the jury subject
to all discrediting circumstances, to receive such weight as may
seem proper." 45 The Court states that it has not yet reached that
stage. May it never. The constitutional immunity from self in-
crimination should never be left to a jury's deliberation. It is 0
matter of law, and as such, should remain with the court's superior
wisdom. A quotation from Mr. Justice Burke's dissenting opinion
in the O'Loughlin case is well taken: "It has been too many cen-
turies, too much blood, and too many hard won constitutions, to
insure men and women fair and impartial trials and freedom from
threat of convictions obtained by confessions extorted by torture,
to permit these rights to be now prejudiced by hasty action." 4,
GENERAL RULES IN COLORADO
Although it is difficult to find in Colorado case law many spe-
cific incidents governing the law of admissibility of confessions,
due in the main to the Court's adherence to the rule of the neces-
sity of finding an abuse of discretion in the trial court,4' there are,
however, certain rules pertaining to confessions which should be
noted.
1. All surrounding circumstances in regard to the making
of the confession should be taken irIto consideration by the trial
court in determining its validity.48 This includes the age, maturity,
intelligence, and character of the defendant, plus the circumstances
surrounding the confinement.
" See note 47 ante.
Wigmore, supra, sec. 867.
"O'Loughlin v. The People, 90 Colo. 368, 400, 10 P. (2d) 543 (1932).
17 Osborn v. The People, supra.
Moss v. The People, 92 Colo. 88, 18 P. (2d) 316 (1932).
Bosko v. The People, 68 Colo. 257, 188 P. 743 (1920).
Moya v. The People, 88 Colo. 139, 293 P. 235 (1930).
Fincher v. The People, 26 Colo. 169, 56 P. 902 (1899).
Saiz v. The People, 93 Colo. 291, 25 P. (2d) 1114 (1933).
Goodfellow v. The People, 75 Colo. 243, 224 P. 1051 (1924).
18Read v. The People, supra.
Osborn v. The People, supra.
Ingles v. The People, 92 Colo. 518, 22 P. (2d) 1109 (1933).
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2. The Court has decided that certain contentions made by
the defense are not sufficient to render a confession involuntary.
An example is that mere failure to warn the defendant that his
statement might be used against him does not render an otherwise
voluntary confession involuntary.49 Nor will a confession be
deemed involuntary due to a delay in bringing the accused before
a committing magistrate,--, nor using abusive language during the
interrogation,' nor inducing a confession by trick of fraud.
2
3. Mental capacity is always a question involved in the law
of admissibility of confessions. If the defendant was asleep at
the time of making the confession, it should be excluded,5 ': and if
there is any doubt as to whether the accused was asleep when the
alleged confession was made, the question should be left to the
jury. 4 As to intoxication, the question is one of degree. If there
is mental capacity sufficient to realize what one is saying, intoxi-
cation is of no consequence.55
4. In regard to procedure, it has been held that failure to
observe procedural requirements of the general rule is not fatal
when there is no prejudice., G In this respect, the Court has held
that it is not reversible error when the trial court fails to conduct
a preliminary hearing without the presence of the jury when the
confession is in fact voluntary.5 Nor will remarks made by the
prosecution in reference to the confession before there is a pre-
liminary hearing invalidate a confession which is subsequently
shown to be voluntary. 58 But it is reversible error for the trial
judge to comment upon the weight which the jury is to attach to
the confession.5 9
5. In the determination of the validity of a confession the
Supreme Court has held that an involuntary confession will have
no effect when there has been a subsequent voluntary confession
made.6 0 A confession will be deemed voluntary when it is sub-
stantiated upon cross-examination, 1 and if there is evidence
49 Cahill v. The People, 111 Colo. 29, 137 P. (2d) 673 (1943).
Reagan v. The People, 49 Colo. 316, 112 P. 785 (1910).
Byram v. The People, 49 Colo. 533, 113 P. 528 (1911).
"Cahill v. The People, supra.
51Buschy v. The People, 73 Colo. 472, 216 P. 519 (1923).
Downey v. The People, 121 Colo. 307, 215 P. (2d) 892 (1950).
5- Osborn v. The People. sitpra.
B' Martinez v. The People, 55 Colo. 51, 132 P. 64 (1913).
Taylor v. The People, 77 Colo. 350, 237 P. 159 (1925).
Martinez v. The People, su pra.
Roper v. The People, 116 Colo. 493, 179 P. (2d) 232 (1947).
Roper v. The People, supra.
Andrews v. The People, 33 Colo. 193, 79 P. 1031 (1905).
' Cahill v. The People, supra.
Mitsunaga v. The People, 54 Colo. 102, 129 P. 241 (1912).
Reagan v. The People, su!pra.
Fincher v. The People, supra.
"Roper v. The People, supra.
"Honda v. The People, 111 Colo. 279, 141 P. (2d) 178 (1943).
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which supports a recital of voluntariness incorporated within
the confession it will be determined voluntary."
2
When the evidence supports the trial court's finding, the ap-
pellate court cannot determine the confession to be involuntary,
for obviously there has been no abuse of discretion."3 Evidence by
the defendant tending to show threats or abuses after the confes-
sion was made is clearly inadmissible,"4 and in like manner is
evidence showing abuse when there is no attempt by the People
to introduce into the record a confession.",
By an examination of the foregoing rules, and of the Osborn
case, it becomes clear that the Colorado Court has reached an
advanced stage in treating confessions. It is a stage of reason
and realism. There is no attempt to promulgate any inflexible
rule .6  There is no attempt to protect the criminal at the expense
of public welfare. There is no evidence of Wigmore's statement
that the only ones who seem to be unaware of the necessities of
police detection are Supreme Court Justices."
7
CONCLUSION
Professor Wigmore cites three possibilities which would help
eliminate the problem."8 The first is to let an authorized, skilled,
magistrate take the confession. In many outlying districts where
crimes are, unfortunately, also committed, this would be virtually
impossible. As far as experts are concerned, witness the Bruner
case, supra.
The second suggestion is to make a moving picture of the pro-
ceedings. Apart from the cost element, this suggestion when
analyzed nears the sublime.
The third suggestion is to let the bench and bar "rigorously
expose and suppress the brutal methods." This is a self-evident
truth, for no member of a learned and ethical profession would
be justified in following any other course.
If and when the practice of regarding confessions with the
realistic and enlightened approach of the Colorado Court is fol-
lowed throughout the common law justidictions, there will no
longer be the necessity of seeking for answers to a problem which
may be solved by mere reasonableness.
"Pearson v. The People, 69 Colo. 76, 168 P. 655 (1917).
O'Donnel v. The People, 71 Colo. 113, 204 P. 330 (1922).
Fincher v. The People, supra.
Bosko v. The People, supra.
,Kolenberger v. The People, 9 Colo. 233, 11 P. 101 (1886).
Brindisi v. The People, 76 Colo. 244, 230 P. 797 (1924).
'Frady v. The People, 96 Colo. 43, 40 P. 606 (1934).
wReagan v. The People, supra.
O'Wigmore, supra, sec. 851.
"Wigmore, su pra, sec. 851.
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